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Abstract: A real-time intelligent fiber-optic perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS) based on 
the fiber Bragg grating (FBG) sensor network is presented in this paper. To distinguish the effects of 
different intrusion events, a novel real-time behavior impact classification method is proposed based 
on the essential statistical characteristics of signal’s profile in the time domain. The features are 
extracted by the principal component analysis (PCA), which are then used to identify the event with 
a K-nearest neighbor classifier. Simulation and field tests are both carried out to validate its 
effectiveness. The average identification rate (IR) for five sample signals in the simulation test is as 
high as 96.67%, and the recognition rate for eight typical signals in the field test can also be achieved 
up to 96.52%, which includes both the fence-mounted and the ground-buried sensing signals. 
Besides, critically high detection rate (DR) and low false alarm rate (FAR) can be simultaneously 
obtained based on the autocorrelation characteristics analysis and a hierarchical detection and 
identification flow. 
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1. Introduction 
With an increase in terrorism in recent years 
especially after 911, it brings most important yet 
difficult security challenges globally, such as the 
perimeter protection of airports, railway stations, 
government buildings, and military bases. The 
advent of fiber sensors opens up more opportunities 
to perimeter security and provides a new promising 
solution for this application [1–4]. Comparing with 
those conventional perimeter intrusion detection 
systems (PIDSs) that use ultrasonic, radar, 
microwave, and infrared or photo-electric sensors to 
detect intrusions, the optical fiber sensor (OFS) has 
outstanding advantages of passive operation, high 
sensitivity, good reliability in harsh conditions, 
long-distance capability, electro-magnetic 
interference immunity (EMI), and corrosion 
resistance, etc. In particular, OFS does not need any 
power supply along the fiber link, and hence it is an 
ideal choice for long or medium long distance 
applications in harsh field environments. Typical 
OFS technologies in the security area include the 
phase-sensitive optical time domain reflectometry 
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(Φ-OTDR) [5–7] and many other OTDR 
technologies [8], Sagnac, Michelson, Mach-Zehnder 
(M-Z) and their combination structures [9–12], 
white light interferometers[13], and 
quasi-distributed FBG sensor networks [14–19]. 
In comparison with the highly sensitive OTDR 
and the interferometer-based fiber fences, fiber 
Bragg grating (FBG) sensors are immune to the 
environmental interferences and thus with more 
reliable detection accuracy and much lower nuisance 
alarm rates (NARs). Besides, they have precise 
location ability, and they are flexible for assigning 
effective sensing and non-sensing fiber lengths 
according to various application requirements. And 
mature multiplexing and interrogation technologies 
make the FBG-based sensing network a potentially 
cost effective and promising monitoring system, 
especially for perimeter of short or middle range. 
Moreover, the FBG sensor response changes linearly 
with the intrusion behavior impacts, so it is more 
helpful to identify the event features. However, the 
event identification is still a pending and challenging 
problem due to the environmental complexity in 
practical uses [20–22], such as changing climates 
like wind and rain, and unpredictable wildlife 
interferences. Even the same person could  
introduce different effects due to different fence 
materials or different sensor mount ways, which 
presents the most difficult problem to extract 
essentially distinguishable characteristics of the 
event targets. 
Thus in this paper, a smart perimeter intrusion 
monitoring system based on the FBG strain sensor 
network is addressed, in which it can not only 
overcome the difficulties of detecting weak 
intrusions from large amounts of nonequivalent 
sensor nodes with high probability of detection (PD) 
and low false alarm rate (FAR), but also it can 
distinguish different threatening activities by using 
the principal component analysis (PCA) feature 
extraction in the time domain and the K-nearest 
neighbor classifier.   
2. Hierarchical detection and 
identification flow in a fiber-optical PIDS 
based on the FBG sensor network 
A quasi-distributed fiber-optic PIDS based on 
the FBG sensor network is constructed as shown in 
Fig. 1. In this system, a huge number of FBG sensors 
with a certain central wavelength for each are 
connected in series or in parallel in the cable to act 
as the basic sensing segments. The cable can be 
attached to a physical fence or buried under ground 
to measure the mechanical deformation of the fence 
or other disturbances from outside. In the FBG 
interrogator, a light source with wide frequency 
band provides original optical signals, and 
simutaneously demodulates the optical signals 
reflected from the separate FBG sensors along the 
fiber and converts them into digital electronic 
signals. And a processing unit which acts as an 
alarm system, processes the signal array and decides 
if any threat happens along the protected perimeter, 
where it is and even what it is. The basic detection 
principle of the system is to monitor the shift of the 
returned “Bragg” wavelength due to the 
perturbations of the gratings. And the PD, FAR, and 
identification rate (IR) are the most concerned 
metrics for the system. 
 
Fig. 1 Configuration of a fiber-optical PIDS based on the 
FBG sensor network. 
Generally, attacks on purpose only occur 
occasionally in the all day long monitoring, and for 
most of the monitoring time there is actually no 
attack or intrusion. To detect the perturbation 
effectively with high confidence, a hierarchical 
detection and identification method is introduced in 
this paper as shown in Fig. 2, which contains three 
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main stages: abnormity detection with high PD, 
nuisance alarm exclusion, and real threat 
identification and classification. At the first two 
stages we only focus on the detection aim and leave 
the identification alone. Thus computation of the 
identification process can be neglected when there 
isn’t any threat, which is quite suitable for the 
on-line monitoring. 
 
Fig. 2 Hierarchical detection and identification flow for the 
FBG-based PIDS. 
3. Abnormity detection with 
autocorrelation analysis and nuisance 
alarm exclusion 
In the sensor network as shown in Fig. 1, all the 
FBG sensors actually have different sensing 
performances, due to their inherent different 
sensitivities with slightly different productions and 
packaging conditions, different attachings or 
burying ways, and changing environments. The 
sensing nodes in the network are nonequivalents and 
the magnitudes of the acquired signal responses 
differ greatly. Therefore, the traditional energy 
thresholding method will definitely result in a low 
PD or a very high FAR in practical applications. 
And for a perimeter with fences of mixed materials, 
the case will become even worse, and it cannot play 
its role any more. Thus the authors introduced a new 
solution, based on the different autocorrelation 
characteristics between the attack signals and the 
non-attack signals [19]. As shown in Fig. 3, the 
non-intrusion and several typical intrusion signals 
for the FBG strain sensors have distinguished 
autocorrelation curves. The line with little square 
marks represents the autocorrelation function of a 
certain intrusion signal, such as climbing, striking, 
swinging, and cutting signals, whose correlation lags 
are always much longer than those of the lines 
without square marks, which signify the case of the 
regular signals without any external perturbation. 
Here the time lag unit is sample with a sampling rate 
of 500 Hz. From the autocorrelation curves, it can be 
seen that the intrusion signal generated from a 
determined energy source is always highly 
correlated with itself, while the signals without 
perturbation are always weakly correlated. Thus it 
can be taken as a basic intrusion detection criterion 
in the first step. 
And in this paper, this method or criterion is also 
proved to be suitable for the FBG vibration sensor 
signals, which can be seen from Fig. 4. In Fig. 4, four 
typical vibration signals of climbing, temperature 
rising, animal disturbing, and cutting are examined. 
The high autocorrelation characteristics of the 
vibration signals are similar to those of the strain 
signals but they have more oscillation components 
for the same event signal. 
At the detection stage, to detect the very weak 
signals from the sensor array, a lower correlation 
threshold is adopted to maintain a quite high PD. 
Thus a lot of environmental interferences such as 
wind, rain, snow, and hailstone, could also be 
involved, which would be the main nuisance alarm 
sources. It is thus necessary to exclude these 
nuisance alarms at the second stage. Fortunately, the 
environmental changes will influence almost all of 
the sensors in the network, while real threats always 
interfere at a local area. And the local and global 
effects can be directly discriminated from the alarm 
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sensor number and their locations. By excluding the 
frequently occurring nuisance sources, the event 
types to be discerned are significantly decreased, 
which not only eases the computation load of the 
identification, but also makes the following 
identification much more reliable. 
    
     (a)                                                     (b) 
    
     (c)                                                    (d)  
Fig. 3 Correlation characteristics of some typical FBG strain sensing signals: (a) climbing, (b) striking, (c) swinging, and        
(d) cutting. 
4. Abnormity detection with 
autocorrelation analysis and nuisance 
alarm exclusion 
4.1 Statistical feature extraction based on PCA 
analysis 
As we investigate this problem, the structure or 
profile of the signals in the time domain reveals 
more distinguishable information for different types 
of events, which could be helpful for identifying 
certain threatening activities in the FBG-based 
opitcal-fiber fence. But the original temporal signal 
has a problem of data redundancy, which is 
definitely not a good vector to be used as the input 
feature for the identification even though it contains 
the whole structure information. Here we use the 
PCA method to convert high dimensional data into a 
few principal features with much lower dimensions. 
It uses the temporal data which can tell the signal’s 
profile differences while avoiding its redundancy in 
the time domain, thus it could be a promising 
solution for the above problem. As a typical 
statistical data analysis method, the PCA is 
successfully employed to find the implicit modality 
buried in the redundant signals in face recognition 
[23] and fault diagnosis [24]. 
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                            (a)                                                      (b)  
    
                               (c)                                                    (d) 
Fig. 4 Correlation characteristics of some typical FBG vibration sensing signals: (a) climbing, (b) temperature rising, (c) animal’s 
disturbing, and (d) cutting. 
 
The principal components analysis process may 
be regarded as a process of characteristic selection 
following the feature extraction. First raw temporal 
intrusion data are transformed into a feature space 
with a much lower dimension, and its primary 
statistical feature vectors are selected as its 
characteristic bases. Each kind of training signal can 
be approximated or reconstructed by a linear 
combination of the primary feature bases. The 
principal features are then selected and used to 
profile the inputs without any redundancy. Assume 
m different intrusion events happened, including 
several typical activity patterns, such as climbing, 
knocking, digging, and walking. The m detected 
signals builds up a set of intrusion vectors, regarded 
as the m  dimensions random vector 
1 2[ , , , ]
T
mX x x x  . And its covariance XC  which 
is denoted as the covariance matrix in this paper is 
defined as 
[( ( ))( ( ) )]TXC E X E X X E X          (1) 
where E(X) is the expected mean value of X. 
Calculate the eigenvalues 1 2, , , m    and 
corresponding normalized eigenvectors  
1 2, , , mU U U  of XC : 
 ( 1,2, , )X i i iC U U i m   .         (2) 
If we consider the covariance XC  as a vector of 
m dimensions, and the eigenvectors 1 2, , , mU U U   
decide the direction of the vector. The eigenvalues 
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1 2, , , m    are the contribution factors of each 
eigenvector, respectively. If the eigenvalue 
corresponding to the eigenvector is bigger, its 
contribution radio is larger in reconstruction, and 
vice versa. A few bigger eigenvalues are kept and 
the smaller ones are neglected, thus the dimension 
gets to fall. The fallen dimensions process selects 
the principal components but discards secondary 
ones, which is just the key spirit of the PCA method. 
Supposing 1 2 m     , the standard deviation 







R M  
 
  .          (3) 
When the standard deviation contribution radio 
( )R M  is big enough (usually take above 90%), the 
first M eigenvectors iU ( 1,  2,  ,  )i M   can be 
selected to build up a projection space, which is also 
regarded as the feature space. In this new space, the 
inputs can be projected as 
T
i iF X U  ( 1,  2,  ,  )i M  .      (4) 
The primary features for each intrusion signal 
are then selected and extracted, which can be 
represented as a feature vector of M  dimensions in 
the fallen dimension space. 
4.2 Identification using a K-Nearest neighbor 
classifier 
Through the above transformation, the test 
samples are individually projected in an 
M-multi-dimensional feature space constructed by 
the training samples. Because similar signals with 
similar feature values could be located at a closer 
location in the new space, then a K-nearest neighbor 
classifier is used to discriminate them. However, the 
identification rate (IR) of this method is mainly 
dependent on whether the extracted PCA features as 
above are distinguishable. It assigns a test sample to 
the jth class if a majority of its nearest neighbors 
belong to the jth class. The neighborhood is defined 
using the Euclidean distance, in which the distance 
between a test sample, xtest, and any training sample 
x is given by  
2
1




xtest x xtest x

  .       (5) 
The Euclidean distances describes the 
dissimilarity of the test sample and the train samples, 
thus is always chosen as the dissimilarity 
representation (DR). 
5. Experimental results and discussion 
5.1 Hierarchical detection with autocorrelation 
analysis 
In this section, the hierarchical detection with 
the autocorrelation analysis is first investigated for 
the fence-mounted sensing nodes. The experimental 
setup is constructed as in Fig. 1. Thirty FBG strain 
sensors are used, and the sensors are installed every 
2 meters for monitoring a perimeter of about 65 
meters length. The interrogator for demodulating the 
FBG sensing signals is MOI si130 (MICRON 
OPTICS, USA) with a sampling frequency of 500Hz. 
In the test, five typical signals are included to be 
detected, such as climbing, striking, swinging, 
pushing, and non-threat signals. The test fences 
include two kinds of wire mesh with different iron 
materials and a kind of window bar of aluminum 
alloy, which are remarked as Fence Type I, II, and 
III, respectively. The test can be classified into two 
groups: (1) The first group is for a single point 
intrusion test, where a total of 564 weak personal 
intrusions are exerted onto the three kinds of fences, 
of which 178 are tested on the harder Al alloy bars 
while the others are tested on the other two soft wire 
meshes, with 198 intrusions each; (2) The second 
one is for multiple-event detection where 350 tests 
are run, and two events are simultaneously exerted 
on two different fences at each time, thus there are 
700 events in total for this group. The detection 
results are concluded in Table 1. The PD can be 
improved up to 99.65% and 99.57% for the single- 
and multiple-event detection, respectively, and the 
missing report rate mainly lies in the harder 
aluminum alloy fence test group.  
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Table 1 Test results for single- and multiple-event detection 
based on the autocorrelation analysis. 












(I: 100; II: 100; 
III: 150) 
700 697 99.57%
5.2 Identification with PCA analysis 
5.2.1 Simulation results and discussion 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
feature extraction and identification method, 
different simulated signals are first trained and 
tested. As shown in Fig. 5(a), five different types of 
signals are generated and taken as the training 
samples, which include two sinusoidal signals of  
10 Hz and 1 Hz, respectively, two periodic square 
waves with different periods (Period1=10 s, 
Period2=5 s, both with duty cycle of 50%) and a 
periodic triangular wave with a period of 6 seconds. 
For the testing samples, we add different delays to 
each kind of signal and modify the amplitude for 
each delayed version as shown in Fig. 5(b), for being 
close to real cases. A total of 30 testing samples are 
generated corresponding to the five training samples 
above, with 6 testing samples for each type. As we 
can see from the identification results in Fig. 6, an IR 
is acquired as high as 96.67% in the simulation test, 
which proves that different signals’ profile or 
structure can be extracted by PCA, and it could 
make a good classification result. 
5.2.2 Field test results and discussion  
To test its actual effectiveness, the field test for 
the FBG-based fiber optical PIDS is also carried out 
around a school building, in which both the 
fence-mounted and the ground-buried sensors are 
tested. The sensor array and the signal demodulating 
configuration used is the same as above in the 
detection test in Section 5.1. Most of the sensors are 
attached onto the perimeter fence, and only two of 
them are buried under the ground. For the 





Fig. 5 Training and testing sample signals for PCA analysis 
and identification: (a) five kinds of training sample signals and 
(b) testing signals corresponding to the training samples. 
 
Fig. 6 Identification results for the simulation test 
(IR=96.67%). 
larger area, we bond the sensing cable onto a soft 
wire mesh of 80 cm width, and bury them into the 
ground together with a burial depth of 15 cm in the 
clay soils. Four seconds of data are taken as a 
processing unit and analyzed for the event decision, 
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which is updated at each second. A field database is 
constructed for eight typical events as shown in  
Fig. 7, which includes 1322 intrusion signals in total. 
Four types are for the fence-mounted sensing cable, 
   
   
   
   
Fig. 7 Typical event signals in the field test. 
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e.g. personal climbing on the fence, personal 
striking on the fence, heating on the fence, cat 
jumping on the fence, and the other four are for the 
ground-buried cable, such as personal digging on the 
ground, personal walking on the ground (across the 
cable), personal running on the ground (across the 
cable), and cat crawling on the ground. Half of the 
signals in each type are taken as training samples 
(661 signals in total), and the other half are testing 
samples (661 signals in total). 
Figure 7 shows that the differences of the eight 
event signals mainly lie in their varying profiles of 
time sequences. Their averaged PCA feature values 
are extracted and concluded in Table 2. From the 
first four dimensions of the feature space, it can be 
seen that each kind of event has distinguishable PCA 
feature values especially in the 1st dimension. 
Choosing the feature dimension as M =4, most of 
the identification results can be achieved up to a 
hundred percent as shown in Table 3, except two 
events occurring in the ground-buried fences, 
walking and running, due to the essential similarity 
between these two activities. In general, the average 
IR can be achieved up to 96.52% for the eight 
typical event targets. 
Table 2 PCA feature values for eight typical event signals in 
the field test. 








climbing ~68575.61 ~ –27.83 ~0.39 ~ 0.44 
Striking ~68710.36 ~ –26.97 ~ –0.12 ~ 0.27 
Fire ~ 67576.74 ~ –26.69 ~ 0.02 ~ 0.26 
Cat jumping on 
the fence ~ 68562.35 ~ –27.05 ~ 0.22 ~ 0.23 
Digging ~ 69000.15 ~ –27.32 ~ 0.12 ~ 0.22 
Walking ~ 69261.58 ~ –27.29 ~ 0.08 ~ 0.32 
Running ~ 69128.55 ~ –27.34 ~ 0.04 ~ 0.27 
Cat crawling 
on the ground ~ 68991.10 ~ –27.04 ~ 0.42 ~ 0.67 
The average IR and its elapsed time varying with 
the dimension of the PCA features are also 
investigated in Fig. 8 for the proposed feature 
extraction and event identification method in this 
field test. As we can see that the IR is always kept 
above 90%, even though it slightly changes with the 
PCA feature dimension M and performs best when 
M is equal to 4, which gives a good proof for the 
proposed method based on the PCA feature 
extraction. The elapsed time for the 661 test samples 
takes more or less 1.2 seconds, and each processing 
unit’s computation time takes less than          
2 miliseconds. The processing time can be nearly 
negligible thus the algorithm is very suitable for the 
on-line identification and classification. 
Table 3 Identification results for eight typical events in the 
field test. 
 IR(%) when M=4 is chosen 
Personal Climbing 
(74 events) 100% 
Knocking 
(25 events) 100% 
Firing 
(109 events) 100% 
Fence-mounted 





(121 events) 100% 
Walking 
(98 events) 89.8% 
Running 
(191 events) 93.2% 
Ground-buried 








Fig. 8 Average IR and its elapsed time varying with the 
feature dimension M. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, it is first presented that the PCA 
method can be used to extract different intrusion 
signal’s profiles or structures in the time domain and 
give good features for the following behavior 
identification of the FBG-based fiber-optical PIDS. 
Based on the autocorrelation characteristics analysis 
and by using a hierarchical detection and 
identification model, the PD for multiple-event 
detection can even be improved up to 99.57%, and 
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an average recognition rate for eight typical events 
in real field test can be achieved as high as 96.52%, 
which is suitable for both the fence-mounted and the 
ground-buried applications. Moreover, the proposed 
detection and identification method can be carried 
out on line in real time. The good performance or 
intelligence improvement of the proposed method 
can promote its application in many important areas 
in perimeter security, safety monitoring of oil/gas 
pipe lines, electrical power lines, large-scale civil 
structures, etc. 
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